Valid Consent To Search | Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
The United States Supreme Court analyzes the meaning of “voluntary consent” when it comes to search and seizure.
The Constitutional Question
Did the appellate court incorrectly hold that the search of the vehicle was invalid because the state failed to show consent given with knowledge that it could be withheld?
The Legal Answer(s)
A 6-3 majority opinion reversed the appellate court decision finding:
- SCOTUS held that whether consent is voluntary can be determined from the totality of the circumstances .
- It is not necessary to prove that the person who gave consent knew that he had the right to refuse.
- The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures doesn’t require a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights.
In addition, SCOTUS explicitly stated that because the Fourth Amendment claims had no merit, the Court did not address the question of whether claims relating to search and seizure should be available to a prisoner filing a writ of habeas corpus.
The Majority
The Dissent
The Facts
Traffic Stop
While on patrol an Officer makes a traffic stop of a vehicle for equipment violations.
People
Six men were inside the vehicle. The driver was Joe Gonzales. Joe Alcala and Robert Bustamonte were passengers in the front seats. The other three men were seated in the rear.
No Driver's License
The driver was unable to produce a driver's license upon request. Only one of the other five passengers had identification. All six men were removed from the vehicle.
Permission to Search
Alcala claimed the vehicle belonged to his brother. Police asked Alcala if they could search the vehicle. Alcala replied, "Sure, go ahead."
Congenial Encounter
Prior to the search, no one was threatened with arrest. As matter of fact, according to testimony the encounter “very congenial” at this point. Alcala even assisted police with the search of the car by opening the trunk and glove compartment.
Stolen Checks Found
Under the left rear seat police found three stolen checks. The checks were later connected to Bustamonte. He was arrested for possessing a check with intent to defraud.
Procedural History
Fourth Amendment Challange
Prior to trial, Bustamonte challenged the legality of vehicle search. He alleged that the consent (given by Alcala) was obtained through coercion . The trial court denied Bustamonte’s motion to suppress, and the checks in question were admitted in evidence at Bustamonte's trial.
Jury Trial
He was convicted by a jury.
Appeals in State Court
The California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District affirmed the conviction. The California Supreme Court denied review.
Writ of Habeas Corpus
He then filed a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district court which was denied. Subsequently, his appeal to the 9th Circuit was also denied.
9th Circuit - Overturns Distict Court's Decision
Subsequently, he sought review by appeal the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. They set aside the District Court's order.
The 9th Circuit reasoned that a consent was a waiver of a person’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and that the State was under an obligation to demonstrate, not only that the consent had been uncoerced, but that it had been given with an understanding that it could be freely and effectively withhold.
The State of California appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. This was done by California Prison Superintendent Merle R. Schneckloth (that is why the case is titled Schneckloth v. Bustamonte ). The Supreme Court would eventually overturn the Ninth Circuit’s decsion.
Decision Highlights
The U.S. Supreme Court stated it granted review “to determine whether the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require the showing thought necessary by the Court of Appeals.”
Valid Consent is Permissible
A search conducted pursuant to a valid consent is constitutionally permissible. [p. 222]
Prosecutor Has The Burden
When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given. [p. 222]
The Precise Question
The precise question in this case, then, is what must the prosecution prove to demonstrate that a consent was ‘voluntarily’ given. And upon that question there is a square conflict of views between the state and federal courts that have reviewed the search involved in the case before us. [p. 223]
Confession Case Law - Used As Guidance
Courts have previously determine the ‘voluntariness' of a defendant's confession for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment It is to that body of case law to which the Court turned for initial guidance on the meaning of ‘voluntariness' in the present context. [p. 223–24]
No Talismanic Definition of Voluntariness
"Those cases yield no talismanic definition of ‘voluntariness,’ mechanically applicable to the host of situations where the question has arisen." [p.224]
Unconscious or Lacking Capacity
It cannot be taken literally to mean a ‘knowing’ choice. ‘Except where a person is unconscious or drugged or otherwise lacks capacity for conscious choice, all incriminating statements—even those made under brutal treatment—are ‘voluntary’ in the sense of representing a choice of alternatives. [p. 224]
Recognizing The Harm of Coerced Confessions
'(I)n cases involving involuntary confessions, this Court enforces the strongly felt attitude of our society that important human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the course of securing a conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will.’ [p. 225]
The Ultimate Test
‘The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process.’ [p. 225-226]
Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances, and while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.
Factual Circumstances & Psychological Impact
In all of these cases, the Court determined the factual circumstances surrounding the confession, assessed the psychological impact on the accused, and evaluated the legal significance of how the accused reacted. [p. 226]
No Single Controlling Criterion
The Court found a significant fact in all of the decisions dealing with the involuntariness of confessions was that none of them turned on the presence or absence of a single controlling criterion ; each reflected a careful scrutiny of all the surrounding circumstances. [p. 226]
When There Is No Probable Cause
The court examined scenarios where the police have some evidence of illicit activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search. The court noted that a search authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable evidence.
In the present case for example, while the police had reason to stop the car for traffic violations, the State does not contend that there was probable cause to search the vehicle or that the search was incident to a valid arrest of any of the occupants.
Consent Must Not Be Coerced
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force. For, no matter how subtly the coercion was applied, the resulting ‘consent’ would be no more than a pretext for the unjustified police intrusion against which the Fourth Amendment is directed. [p. 228]
Compared to Miranda Rights
The Court found under the Fourth Amendment the government is not required to inform a person his or her right to object to a consent search. This differs from Miranda Rights. In Miranda v. Arizona the Court held that a person must know of their rights against self-incrimination once in custodial interrogation.
Waiver Approach to Consent Rejected
A ‘waiver’ approach to consent searches would be thoroughly inconsistent with our decisions that have approved ‘third party consents.’ [p. 245]
A Narrow Decision
The Court explicitly stated it's decision was a "narrow one." We hold only that when the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied. [p. 248–49]
xxxxxxx
-If the subject knows he or she has a right to refuse, it is a factor to be considered, but that fact is not the sole consideration.
The General Rule
The test to determine if consent to search was voluntary is whether a person knew of his or her right to refuse consent. Rather, the is whether the totality of circumstances shows that the person was voluntarily consenting to the search.
- Being advised of your right to refuse to consent is not a prerequisite to consent being deemed voluntary.
- The practical result being that police are not required to inform you of you right to refuse their request to search.
Concurring Opinions
The Powell Concurrence
Justice Powell argued that the proper issue was whether Bustamonte "was provided a fair opportunity to raise and have adjudicated the question in state courts." He believed Bustamonte should not have been permitted base his habeas petition on a Fourth Amendment claim [unless he was arguing that the state court had improperly denied him an opportunity to raise the claim. This related to an issues raised in another decision - Kaufman v. United States (1969) ].
The Blackmun Concurrence
Justice Blackmun argued the Court should not have reconsidered its opinion in a precedent-setting case, Kaufman v. United States (1969) , in deciding Bustamonte's case.
Dissenting Opinions
The Brennen Dissent
Justice William O. Douglas dissented, arguing that the Ninth Circuit made the correct decision. Justice William J. Brennan wrote a separate dissent, stating that a person cannot waive their Fourth Amendment rights when he is unaware that his rights would be constitutionally protected if he did not waive those rights.
It wholly escapes me how our citizens can meaningfully be said to have waived something as precious as a constitutional guarantee without ever being aware of its existence. In my view, the Court's conclusion is supported neither by ‘linguistics,’ nor by ‘epistemology,’ nor, indeed, by ‘common sense.’ I respectfully dissent.
The Marshall Dissent
Justice Marshall argued that the prosecution cannot rely on consent to a search if the person who gave consent did not know he could refuse consent. Put another way, Marshall argued that unless a person knows of their right to refuse to a search, any consent is not voluntary.
Read the opinion HERE
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